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Abstract:  
 
The entry into force of the Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance at the end of 2010 signified the most important step in the struggle against 
enforced disappearances and marked a development in international human rights law. This 
article provides a historical overview of the phenomenon and tracks the background of the 
Convention’s adoption. It analyses and evaluates the definition adopted by the Convention. It 
also probes into practices applied against terrorism and suggests that they should be classified 
as enforced disappearances under the Convention. Overall, it is argued that the Convention’s 
application can be expected to cement detainees’ protection.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Enforced or involuntary disappearances are a persisting phenomenon globally. The 
international community has been addressing it for more than forty years, not 
always successfully. All previous attempts have been stumbling at states’ reluctance 
to share information and admit the exercise of disappearances, as well as to punish 
themselves (i.e. their organs and agents involved therein). Thereby there was not 
any international legal framework for years and only fragmented regional efforts 
had been recorded. Still, disappearances’ complexity has turned into a retarding 
factor for the complete legal response to the phenomenon. Unlike torture and 
extraordinary executions, disappearances cannot be easily conceptualized and 
further captured in a definition. As a result, only the systematic study of the 
phenomenon’s historical background can determine its specificity. States, or more 
precisely governments, have developed a number of practices which varied slightly, 
yet significantly, to erase the traces of those they considered opponents; opponents 
being determined mainly by their political beliefs or solely by their race. As a matter 
of fact, any legal response should cover all forms a disappearance could take and 
offer the maximum protection to any potential victim. The legal imprint of the 
phenomenon should correspond to all factual combinations and at the same time 
avoid a descriptive character. These are the pillars the 2007 United Nations 
Convention on Enforced Disappearances lies on. The international community has 
learnt its lesson well and took a holistic approach on the phenomenon of enforced 
disappearances. The definition provided takes into account the historical aspects of 
disappearances and aims to comprise all contemporary methods applied by states 
currently. In this sense, the Convention’s definition serves a double goal: first, to 
demonstrate the distinct character of the phenomenon and protect all persons from 
the standardized methods reported so far and secondly to prevent the emergence of 
novel practices of disappearances. Regarding the first goal, there is little doubt for 
the Convention’s success; however as disappearances remain in reality there are still 
challenges to be resolved. In this respect, the practices states apply to investigate 
terrorist acts incorporate elements of disappearances and raise the question whether 
they could fall within the Convention’s protective scope and be classified as enforced 
disappearances. Anti-terrorist methods are a test for the Convention’s applicability; 
uncharted waters which need to be further explored. All told, the Convention’s value 
depends primarily on its applicability to current developments in public 
international law.     
2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The term ‘enforced disappearances’ (desapararición forzada) was introduced by Latin 
American NGOs1 to encapsulate a phenomenon that occurred in South America in 
the second half of the 20th century. For some authors this term is ‘a euphemism’2 for 
describing a series of severe human rights violations. Moreover, enforced 
                                                 
1 ECOSOC ‘Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Disappearances and Summary 
Executions’ UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/71 (8 January 2002) para 8. 
2 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Now You See, Now You Don’t: The State’s Duty to Punish 
Disappearances and Extra-Judicial Executions’ (2002) 3 AustlInt’lLJ 176, 182. 
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disappearances are considered a recent addition to the human rights agenda,3 and it 
has attracted global concern principally because of the large number of victims.  
 
Enforced disappearances were recorded for the first time during World War II, 
when thousands were disappeared due to the policy of the ‘Night and Fog Decree’ 
(known as the ‘Keitel Order’).4 In that case, Adolf Hitler ordered the transfer of 
people who were deemed dangerous for the security of the Third Reich to the 
concentration camps in Germany. Vanishing without leaving a trace and providing 
information was thought to be an appropriate measure for the intimidation of the 
potential enemies of the Reich. 
 
This Gestapo policy later spiraled in Latin America taking the form of a systematic, 
governmental practice; this practice aimed at the suppression of political opposition, 
since it was considered a threat to national security.5  More specifically, during the 
1960s and the 1970s, and especially within the political context of the Cold War, 
military juntas seized power in most Latin American countries. The majority of 
those military juntas were serving the establishment and preservation of a capitalist 
system based upon foreign investments. These dictatorships are usually referred to 
as ‘bureaucratic – authoritarian’ regimes. This term emphasizes the fact that the 
Latin American dictators did not aim to dissolve public institutions, but on the 
contrary to use them in favour of their regime. Consequently, at some level the term 
‘enforced disappearances’ is also a synonym for the incessant use of military force to 
obliterate any form of opposition and to ensure public order. In this setting, enforced 
disappearances proved to be an effective measure for the sustainability of the military 
juntas. 
 
Overall, the juntas sought to terrorize people in order to establish civil obedience. 
Therefore, the authorities turned against civilians regardless of their ideology 
making disappearances a part of everyday life in Latin America. Governments 
elaborated a very specific and detailed mode of operation. The victims were usually 
carried off from their homes in the presence of their families. Then they were 
transferred to secret detention centers where they were tortured to death. Torture 
was not an interrogation method but rather a means of dehumanizing the detainees, 
before death. The military applied unlimited torture, although they did not aim to 
extract information or obtain confessions from the victims. They viewed torture as 
part of their mission to cleanse society politically; opponents had to be punished 
before executed. The authorities refused to inform the victims’ relatives of their fate 
and denied their detention. Most of the cases ended in extrajudicial executions and 
very few victims survived and reappeared.6 This situation raised the concern of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR). After making 
reference to Argentina’s ‘disappeared’ in 1978 it began to report on disappearances 
                                                 
3 ECOSOC (n 1), para 7. 
4 Christopher K Hall, ‘Enforced disappearance of persons’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellscaft 1991)151.  
5 L Roniger and M Sznajder, The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern Cone, Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay (OUP 1999) 7-28. 
6 National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), ‘Nunca Más (Never Again) 
Report’, 1984.  
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in Guatemala and Chile, encountering unsurprisingly the regimes’ unwillingness to 
cooperate.7            
 
Nevertheless enforced disappearances soon spread beyond Latin America. By way of 
example, during the 1970s many individuals’ status was also unknown in Cyprus, as 
a result of the 1974 Turkish military intervention. However, these victims are not 
referred to as ‘disappeared persons’ but as ‘missing’ or ‘persons unaccounted for’, to 
demonstrate the difference between the causes of their disappearance.8 This pattern 
suggests that enforced disappearances were mainly ‘attributable to political 
reasons’.9 The Philippines is another example where disappearances served as a tool 
against political opposition. During the Marcos Dictatorship (1971-1986) the 
country suffered from innumerous disappearances which were systematically applied 
from 1976 onwards. Hence, enforced disappearances are not a regional phenomenon 
or one rooted only in regimes perpetrating atrocities. It also occurs in countries with 
long-standing internal conflicts.10 In other cases, enforced disappearances are used 
by governments to decimate indigenous populations11 or they are associated to 
gender-based violence supported by the authorities.12  
 
Consequently, the phenomenon has troubled the international community as it 
continues to proliferate and because the perpetrators usually remain unpunished. For 
over forty years, the international community struggles for a viable legal response to 
enforced disappearances. Its responses, though, have not always been to the benefit 
of the victims, or as influential as victims and their relatives would expect. Finally, 
the 2007 Convention seems to satisfy both states and civil society and to enhance all 
persons protection from disappearances. 
3. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO ENFORCED 
DISAPPEARANCES 
 
In the beginning, the international community treated the phenomenon of enforced 
disappearances in casu by appointing ad hoc Working Groups to monitor the 
application of human rights standards in Chile and Cyprus. Soon it became clear that 
a holistic approach was necessary and the General Assembly adopted resolution 
                                                 
7 Organization of American States, ‘Report on the Status of Human Rights in Guatemala’ Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/SerL./V/II53, Doc 22, rev 2 (Washington DC 13 
October 1981) Chapter II; Organization of American States, ‘Report on the Status of Human Rights 
in Chile’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/SerL/V/II.34, Doc 21, corr 1 
(Washington DC 25 October 1974) Chapter IX. The Pinochet regime did not provide information to 
the Commission, despite its numerous visits and special reports. Chile remained for many years a land 
of violence. 
8 ECOSOC (n 1) para 12. 
9 Ibid para 13. 
10 UNCHR ‘Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ (21 January 
2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/58, paras 322-323. 
11 Coronel and others v Colombia, Human Rights Committee (HRC) (2002) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997; Vicente and others v Colombia, HRC (1997) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/56/D/612/1995. 
12 González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 205 
(16 November 2009); UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Report 
on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under 
article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention and reply from the Government of Mexico’ (27 
January 2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/Mexico, paras 61-110. 
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33/173 on ‘Disappeared Persons’13 requesting the Human Rights Commission to 
‘consider the question of disappeared persons with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations’.14 Thereinafter, the ECOSOC requested both the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities ‘to consider the subject and make recommendations to the 
Commission on Human Rights’.15 The Sub-Commission recommended the 
establishment of a group of experts to collect ‘all the information … and to make the 
necessary contacts with the Governments and the families concerned’.16 The United 
Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (UNWGEID) 
was established with a resolution adopted without a vote by the Commission on 
Human Rights.17  
 
The establishment of the UNWGEID was not an easy task. As soon as 
disappearances became part of the UN human rights agenda, tensions grew between 
states over the appropriate way to address the phenomenon. The drafting of a 
legally binding instrument was out of the question for almost all delegations, 
because the phenomenon was relatively new in the international plane and there was 
a lack of knowledge about the issue.18 
 
However, the majority of states had realized that there should be an international 
response to enforced disappearances and so they suggested the establishment of a 
thematic mechanism, the UNWGEID. By contrast, states that applied the policy of 
enforced disappearances (like Argentina and Uruguay) opposed the creation of the 
mechanism; instead, they preferred the adoption of resolutions which would only 
acknowledge the existence of enforced disappearances. At that point it was the 
dedication of human rights NGOs to achieve a long-term solution that proved 
instrumental. Having secured political and diplomatic support by the American 
delegation,19 they tried to rouse public concern on enforced disappearances and 
pressure governments to reach an agreement. To this end they organized campaigns 
on enforced disappearances and released particular details on the applied 
governmental practices.20 These activities in conjunction with incessant lobbying 
paved the way for the establishment of the UNWGEID. Even states that were 
initially opposing to its creation, finally conceded to it, as it was the only way to 
avoid further criticism of their policies. Overall, certain states considered the 
UNWGEID an important step against enforced disappearances, whereas others saw 
it as the least problematic approach on the topic.21 Still, even under these 
circumstances, the creation of the UNWGEID reveals a conscious and alarmed 
international community. 
                                                 
13 UNGA Res 33/173 (20 December 1978). 
14 Ibid operative clause 2. 
15 ECOSOC Res 1979/38 (10 May 1979). 
16 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ (1981) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/1435, Annex III. 
17 UNCHR ‘Question of Missing and Disappeared Persons’ (1980) UN Doc E/CN.4/Res/1980/20, 
operative clause 1. 
18 Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in 
China (OUP 2000) 40. 
19 William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “A Curious Grapevine” 
(Palgrave 2001) 250. 
20 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms 
(Princeton University Press 2001) 17. 
21 Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and 
International Law: in Search of a Sense of Community (School of Human Rights Research 2006) 82-89. 
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In this context, the UNWGEID’s mandate depended much on international politics. 
Indeed, the Group had a narrow but clear mandate to deal with disappearances that 
involved a degree of governmental involvement and liability. At the same time, it 
decided not to address disappearances associated with armed conflicts.22 It also 
‘decided to approach its tasks in a humanitarian spirit’,23 meaning that in the context 
of Cold War it should not get involved in or criticize the member-states’ domestic 
politics. It would instead seek governmental cooperation in order to function as a 
third party between the families of the disappeared and the liable governments. 
Thereafter the UNWGEID was heavily criticized for its dubious approach to the 
problem both by several human rights NGOs and authors. However, it was not the 
chosen approach that caused dissatisfaction, but the low rate of the cases that were 
resolved and the growing number of enforced disappearances worldwide.24 
 
Apart from the UNWGEID’s attempts to provide answers for the victims’ fate, their 
relatives continued seeking the truth, either individually or through associations 
they had created. In a number of cases, their quest for justice led them to submit 
communications to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) under Article 5 of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). 
 
The views of the HRC set the foundations for the protection of individuals. In the 
first communication considered (Eduardo Bleier v Uruguay)25 it found breaches of 
Articles 6, 7 and 10 of the ICCPR and held state authorities responsible for the fate 
of the individual.26 The importance of HRC’s conclusions lies in the reversal of the 
burden of proof that it established in cases of disappeared people.27 The HRC held 
constantly that state parties have by definition more access to the necessary 
information than the individuals and their insufficient responses turn in favour of the 
complainants. The HRC also stated that the parties’ undertaking to provide the 
Committee with the requested information follows their positive obligation to 
conduct full investigations as to the fate of the disappeared.28 Unfortunately, the 
HRC’s lack of enforcement capacity has proved to be an obstacle difficult to 
surmount. The ‘naming and shaming’ strategy that has been developed by the HRC 
seems to be an inadequate tool to deter enforced disappearances, let alone that this 
process was still in its infancy at that time. Therefore, it signaled a considerable 
advance when the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights 
accepted the challenge to cope with enforced disappearances and bring the 
perpetrators to justice.  
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) proved to be a leading 
authority in disappearances. On 23 July 1988 the IACHR held a ‘landmark ruling’29 
                                                 
22 UNCHR  (n 16) para 3. 
23 Ibid para 30.  
24 JD Livermore and BC Ramcharan, ‘“Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances”: An Evaluation of a 
Decade of United Nations Action’ (1989-1990) 6 CHRYB 217, 217-230.  
25 Bleier v Uruguay, HRC (1982) UN Doc CCPR/C/15/D/30/1978.  
26 Ibid para 13. 
27 Quinteros v Uruguay, HRC (1983) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2, para 11. 
28 Arévalo v Colombia, HRC (1989) UN Doc CCPR/C/37/P/181/1984, para 10; UNHRC, Sixteenth 
Session 1982, ‘General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art.6)’ (30 April 1982) para 4. 
29 Linda Drucker, ‘Governmental Liability for “Disappearances”: A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ (1988-1989) 25 Stan J Int’l L 289. 
 VOLUME 5  EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
 126 
concerning the Velásquez Rodriguez Case.30 The case is of paramount importance not 
only regarding the domain of enforced disappearances, but also for the protection of 
human rights in the Inter-American system in general, since it was the first time 
that the IACHR applied its compulsory jurisdiction in a contested case.31 Moreover, 
the case is pivotal because the Court established special evidential standards 
regarding the practice of enforced disappearances and for the first time a state was 
held responsible for performing disappearances. More specifically, the Court lowered 
the required threshold of evidence as it acknowledged that one of disappearances’ 
main aims is to efface all evidence32 and held that ‘circumstantial evidence, indicia, 
and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent 
with the facts’.33 In a unanimous ruling it found Honduras responsible for the 
disappearance of the victim. In doing so it declared the violation of several rights of 
the ACHR, as disappearances were not stipulated per se in the Convention. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the violation of these rights was in direct 
conjunction with the obligation of state parties of the ACHR to organize their legal 
orders in a way that it guarantees the protection of human rights (Article 1(1)). 
Consequently, it was established that enforced disappearances were violating the 
ACHR’s values, in toto.34 
 
The ruling created a leading precedent for the Inter-American legal order and 
confirmed the awareness of this regional community on enforced disappearances. 
The Court used exactly the same argumentation in the cases to follow and 
pinpointed that their common feature is the purpose of weakening political 
opponents35 and intimidating the population.36 It regarded disappearances as part of 
a general and systematic practice applied by governments. The Court, though, drew 
away from this line of argumentation in some of the ensuing cases of enforced 
disappearances it dealt with, with the view to strengthen the procedural aspects of 
the trials. In the case of Caballero-Delgado and Santana v. Colombia the Court affirmed 
that disappearances may arise on an occasional basis and not as part of a systematic 
practice.37 In this case, uncontested evidence was presented on behalf of the victims 
regarding their disappearance and subsequent execution. The existence of strong 
evidence determined the Court’s decision to a great extent. By contrast, in cases 
where evidence was insufficient to either indicate a governmental practice on 
disappearances or the victims’ mistreatment and suffering, the Court did not 
pronounce a violation of the ACHR.38    
 
The plethora of reported cases revealed the phenomenon’s diffusion as well as the 
cruelty it entailed. The attempts of the HRC and the IACHR to deal with enforced 
                                                 
30 Velásquez-Rodriguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 4 (29 July 
1988). 
31 Claudio Grossman, ‘Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim Representation in 
Human Rights Litigation’ (1991-1992) 15 HastingsInt’l&CompLRev 363.  
32 Velásquez-Rodriguez v Honduras (n 30) para 131; Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v Honduras, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 6 (15 March 1989) para 127. 
33 Velásquez-Rodriguez v Honduras (n 30) paras 130, 188. 
34 Ibid (n 30) para 158. 
35 Godínez-Cruz v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 5 (20 January 
1989) para 154b(i). 
36 Caracazo v Venezuela, IACHR Series C No 58 (11 November 1999); Blanco Romero v Venezuela, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 137 (28 November 2005). 
37 Caballero-Delgado and Santana v Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 22 
(8 December 1995). 
38 Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v Honduras (n 32) paras 157-158. 
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disappearances stumbled at the lack of established international standards that 
would provide for a common understanding and legal basis. It gradually became 
evident that the phenomenon of enforced disappearances could not be captured by 
reference to already existing norms. The need for a more thorough and effective 
approach, based on a set of basic legal principles was evidently obvious. 
 
The international community took prompt action leading to the adoption of the 1992 
UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances 
(hereinafter 1992 Declaration).39 Some of the factors which finally led to the 
adoption of the Declaration include public awareness and the constant pressure from 
NGOs towards the drafting of Conventions on Enforced Disappearances, the 
adoption of the Convention Against Torture (CAT 1984) and the recommendations 
made by the UNWGEID.40 Soon after the Declaration, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) adopted the Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons.41 It was the first legally binding document, which tackled the phenomenon 
directly, tailored to the idiosyncrasy of the regional plane it was designed for. 
Overall, this Convention enhanced the Inter-American system for the protection of 
human rights and promoted democratization in Latin America countries.  
 
All the same, there were a few occasions where international courts displayed very 
‘limited understanding of the phenomenon’42 as they applied formalistic criteria. This 
happened particularly when the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) first 
dealt with enforced disappearances in 1998. As discussed below, the ECHR’s 
jurisprudence proved inconsistent with the approach of the HRC and the IACHR so 
far. It may be said that different circumstances ask for a different approach, yet there 
were some instances when the Court’s judgments were simply deficient. The vast 
majority of the cases tried by the ECHR were related to Turkey. They were 
associated with the internal disturbances in the south-eastern region of the country, 
which is mostly populated by Kurds.43 The Court, though, did not acknowledge that 
disappearances were systematically practiced there and tried them on an ad hoc basis. 
Its approach diverged from the one already established by the IACHR.44 Moreover, 
in contrast to the approach of the IACHR and the HRC, the ECHR decided to apply 
high evidentiary standards. Thus, it did not accept that a reversal in the burden of 
proof was necessary and did not lower the evidentiary threshold as it demanded 
proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.45 As a result, the applicants had to present 
information they could not access, which is in effect ‘a sort of probatio diabolica’.46 On 
top of that, the ECHR created a quantitative formula when it came to violations of 
                                                 
39 UNGA Res 47/133 (18 December 1992) UN Doc A/47/49. The UNWGEID was assigned to 
report any obstacles during its application and to monitor its implementation in the member-states 
(an expansion of its mandate), UNCHR ‘Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances’ (1994) UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/26, para 74.  
40 ECOSOC (n 1) para 44.  
41 OAS, ‘Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons’ General Assembly Res 
AG Res 1256 (XXIV-O/94) (Belem Do Para 6 September 1994). 
42 T Scovazzi and G Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United 
Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher and VSP 2007) 191. 
43 Çakici v Turkey, App no 23657/94 (ECHR, 8 July 1999); Ismail Ertak v Turkey, App no 20764/92 
(ECHR, 9 May 2000); Tas v Turkey, App no 24396/94 (ECHR, 14 November 2000); Ciçek v Turkey, 
App no 25704/94 (ECHR, 27 February 2001). 
44 Irum Taqi, ‘Adjudicating Disappearance Cases in Turkey: An Argument for Adopting the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ Approach’ (2000-2001) 24 Fordham Int’l LJ 940, 966-967.  
45 Kurt v Turkey, App no 24276/94 (ECHR, 25 May 1998) paras 99, 107. 
46 Scovazzi and Citroni (n 42) 190. 
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the right to life.47 It held that the victims could be presumed dead only when a 
considerable period of time had passed without any news from the disappeared48 
which left unanswered questions as to the status of people who disappeared not long 
ago. It was not until recently, that the ECHR adopted a more flexible approach and 
acknowledged the relation between enforced disappearance and the threat of death. 
In the case of Baysayeva v. Russia it held that disappearances are life-threatening, 
when the victims disappear under violent circumstances.49  However, there are some 
positive aspects in the ECHR’s jurisprudence, especially when it comes to member-
states’ duties under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court 
held that states have a duty to effectively investigate every case of disappearance. 
This duty emanates from the general obligation established under Article 2 of the 
ECHR to ‘protect the right to life by law’. Therefore, member-states have to conduct 
prompt and profound investigations on the fate of the disappeared as soon as they 
take notice of it; their failure to do so constitutes a breach to the ECHR. In other 
words, the Court did not easily pronounce a violation of the right to life resulting 
from a disappearance, however it required states investigate the alleged violation,50 
compensating for its hesitance to presume the victims’ deaths.       
 
Despite serious developments on the international level – such as the adoption of the 
1992 Declaration and the progressive evolution of jurisprudence – there were still 
unsolved issues, which hindered a satisfactory response to the phenomenon. Such 
inconsistencies could not be easily surmounted without a universal instrument which 
would directly address the main issues of the phenomenon. In 1998 the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted a Draft 
International Convention on the Protection of all Persons from Forced 
Disappearance51 (1998 Draft), which shed light on key aspects of the phenomenon. 
Moving forward and capitalising upon previous efforts, the Commission on Human 
Rights adopted without a vote resolution 2001/46, according to which an 
independent expert (Prof. Manfred Nowak, a former member of the UNWGEID) 
had to examine the existing international human rights’ framework on enforced 
disappearances and report on the necessity of a ‘legally binding normative 
instrument’.52 Reaffirming the strong concern of the international community, the 
resolution established an ‘Inter-sessional Open-ended Working Group (ISWG) to 
elaborate a draft legally binding instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance’,53 having taken into consideration the recommendations of 
the expert. Professor Nowak concluded that a legally binding instrument was 
essential for establishing protection against disappearances, since there existed gaps 
regarding, inter alia, the definition of the term, the perpetrators’ punishment and the 
phenomenon’s prevention. Thus, he proposed three possible forms: 
 
                                                 
47 Carla Buckley, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in Turkey’ 
(2001) 1 HumRtsLRev 35, 55-64. 
48 In the case of Timurtaş v Turkey, the ECHR set a very high threshold of six and a half years, to 
presume the victim’s death. Timurtaş v Turkey, App no 23531/94 (ECHR, 13 June 2000) paras 82-86. 
49 Baysayeva v Russia, App no 74237/01 (ECHR, 5 May 2007) para 119. 
50 Mahmut Kaya v Turkey, App no 22535/93 (ECHR, 28 March 2000) paras 342-343. 
51 UNCHR ‘Report of the sessional working group on the administration of justice (1998) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/19, Annex. 
52 UNCHR Res 46 (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/46, para 12. 
53 ibid. 
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‘a separate human rights treaty such as the draft convention, an optional 
protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or an 
optional protocol to the Convention against Torture.’54   
 
It was then upon the ISWG to decide the form of the document. The Working 
Group decided that a separate treaty would be the most appropriate form55 and in 
2005 it submitted a draft to the Commission on Human Rights.56   
 
Finally, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (Convention) was adopted by the newly created Human 
Rights Council and consecutively by the Third Committee and the General 
Assembly.57 It entered into force on 23 December 2010 and it now counts 32 
members and 91 signatories. As the European Union representative stated during 
the GA Plenary Session, the Convention ‘sends a strong political signal from the 
international community that this shameful and still widespread practice must come 
to an end’.58  
 
Indeed, the Convention fills serious gaps in the protection against disappearances. 
The creation of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance alongside the 
definition of disappearance are probably the most important achievements of the 
Convention. The creation of a comprehensive, protective legal framework requires 
the phenomenon’s crystallization. Accordingly, the Convention’s definition is the 
starting point for understanding all persons’ right not to be subjected to enforced 
disappearance, but also for grasping the concepts and values of the Convention. 
4. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES: THE QUEST FOR A WIDELY 
ACCEPTED AND COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION 
 
The definition of enforced disappearances proved to be an issue of legal and political 
controversy.59 During the last years, disappearances have been labeled by a diversity 
of characterizations, which were used almost indistinguishably.60 As a result, once 
disappearances attracted international concern, shedding light on the content of the 
term proved to be a difficult task.  
 
                                                 
54 ECOSOC (n 1) para 97. 
55 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Intersessional Open-Ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally 
Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances’ 
(2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59. 
56 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Intersessional Open-Ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally 
Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances’ 
(2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66. 
57 UNGA ‘Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled 
“Human Rights Council”’ (23 June 2006) 1st Session (2006) UN Doc A/HRC/1/L.2; UNGA ‘Report 
of the Third Committee’ (6 December 2006) 61st Session (2006) UN Doc A/61/448, para 27; UNGA 
Res 61/177 (12 January 2007) UN Doc A/Res/61/177. 
58 UNGA ‘Verbatim Record’ (20 December 2006) UN Doc A/61/PV.82, 3. 
59 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances’ (1998) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/1999/62. 
60 Characterizations varied from forced, enforced, involuntary, to political or even systematic. HM 
Kleinman, ‘Disappearances in Latin America: A Human Rights Perspective’ (1986-1987) 19 NYU J 
Int’l L & Pol 1033, 1033. 
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Human rights NGOs were the first to respond to the need for ‘conceptual clarity’.61 
From the early 1980s, NGOs engaged in a strenuous quest for a definition; yet all 
definitions have been descriptive and followed an analytical approach of the practices 
developed by governments.  The UN was also in search of a definition, but it did not 
come to any until the adoption of the 1992 Declaration. That definition came as the 
precursor of the one which states parties concluded in the 2006 United Nations’ 
Convention, however it was not a part of the Declaration itself, but only a 
preambular clause. The 1992 Declaration has proven instrumental, since it 
‘proclaims’ itself ‘as a body of principles for all states’62 and is the first international 
document to declare that ‘any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to human 
dignity’, thus violating a series of human rights. Moreover, the act of enforced 
disappearance also constitutes an offence under criminal law. This conceptualization 
clearly illustrates the reasons why the 1992 Declaration was a landmark; it 
established a definition at the international level and stipulated that enforced 
disappearances should be treated as offences under the domestic legal orders. The 
indispensability of the definition is due to the fact that an offence (enforced 
disappearance) had been acknowledged. Thus a domestic legal order should prevent 
and punish such acts. Given this evident correlation between the definition and the 
offence and their parallel lives, it could be argued, that despite its preambular 
placement, the definition has been functionally incorporated into the main part of the 
Declaration. Moreover, the 1992 Declaration remains important even after the 
adoption of the Convention, since 
 
[i]t sets forth a set of rules that all the Member States of the United Nations, 
without the requirement of a ratification are called upon to apply as a minimum 
to prevent and suppress the practice,63 
 
and because it might be also considered of customary value.64  
The definition given is principally based on the ‘working definition’ adopted by the 
UNWGEID in its annual reports.65 The UNWGEID in its general comments on the 
Declaration stated the elements that a definition of enforced disappearance should 
include three minimum cumulative elements, which are:  
 
a) deprivation of liberty against the will of the person concerned, b) involvement 
of governmental officials, at least indirectly by acquiescence, c) refusal to 
disclose the fate and whereabouts of the person concerned.66  
 
These elements are interconnected and reveal the historicity and complexity of the 
crime.67 However, this offence presupposes that there exists governmental 
involvement or at least awareness of the perpetration of the crime, obviously 
                                                 
61 Jan Egeland, ‘Political “Disappearances” – A Challenge for Humanitarian Law’ (1982) 51 Nordisk 
Tidsskrift Int’lRet 189, 189. 
62 UNGA Res 47/133 (n 39) operative clause 1.  
63 UNHCHR ‘Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances’ (Geneva 2009) UN Doc Fact Sheet 
No.6/Rev.3, 6. 
64 Gabriella Citroni and Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Recent Developments in International Law to Combat 
Enforced Disappearances’ (2009) 3 Revista Internacional de Direito e Cidadania 89, 93.  
65 ECOSOC (n 1) 70. 
66 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances’ (1996) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/1996/38, para 55. 
67 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances’ (1983) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/1984/21, para 178.  
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rendering the above provision useless, if there is no political will to punish the crime 
and suppress this practice.68   
 
The significance of the progress made in 1992 is beyond doubt. Apart from 
establishing ‘the autonomous nature of the crime’69 it gave impetus to a broader 
debate upon the issue. Therefore the next step deemed essential was the creation of a 
right per se, not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. Article 1 of the 
Convention established a new right, using a negative formulation, and after intensive 
negotiations the state-parties finally concluded a definition (Article 2). 
 
The term ‘enforced disappearance’ was the focal point during the negotiations as it 
would naturally entail specific state obligations. The definition given in Article 2 of 
the Convention follows the pattern of the 1992 Declaration, but the formulation of 
the term is substantially different, although phrasal alterations seem slight. Article 2 
reads as follows: 
 
“[e]nforced disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction 
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons 
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of 
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by 
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which will 
place such a person outside the protection of the law. 
 
The term is analyzed in three elements according to the dominant approach. It is 
explicitly stated that the deprivation of liberty is the first element of an enforced 
disappearance. The final phrasing is the outcome of negotiations, a compromise 
between the proposals made during the sessions of the ISWG. The initial wording, 
proposed in the Working Group by the Chairperson-Rapporteur referred to ‘the 
deprivation of a person’s liberty, in whatever form’.70 The follow up debate brought 
to light two different trends. Some states endorsed the Chairperson’s suggestion, 
with a view to ensuring full protection, whereas other states considered the phrasing 
‘imprecise’,71 thus calling for the use of more specified terms. Although, the use of 
specified terms such as arrest, detention and abduction would be ‘by way of 
example’,72 meaning that the listing in the definition is not exhaustive, it seems that 
the delegations sought for clarity in the definition in order to limit ambiguity. 
 
However, these terms do not only serve as examples in the context of the 
Convention. Their explicit enumeration, signals that they constitute essential 
components of a ‘disappearance’.73 They form part of the crime, an element of it 
(actus reus).74 Finally, these terms are of considerable conceptual value, because they 
                                                 
68 Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances (n 66) para 51. 
69 Citroni and Scovazzi (n 64) 92-93. 
70 UNCHR (n 56) para 17.  
71 UNCHR (n 55) para 20. 
72 UNCHR (n 56) para 19. 
73 Gangaram-Panday v Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 16 (21 
January1994). 
74 This approach differs from the one the ECHR follows. For the ECHR, a disappearance is an 
‘aggravated form of arbitrary detention’. For that reason, the Court finds it important that the 
disappeared were last seen in custody by governmental authorities. The Convention focuses on 
deprivation of liberty as well, but it does not treat it as a prerequisite for a disappearance to occur. 
Orhan v Turkey, App no 25656/94 (ECHR, 18 June 2002) paras 265, 278; Tekdag v Turkey, App no 
27699/95 (ECHR, 15 January 2004) paras 66, 68.  
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are invoked in the most important international human rights instruments and their 
content has been enriched through the interpretation of international courts and 
tribunals over the years.  
 
Another contested issue during the negotiations was that of lawfulness. Some 
delegations expressed the opinion that only cases of unlawful deprivation of liberty 
should be included.75 But the majority of states did not welcome this approach 
opining that it would dramatically limit the term’s field of application. Besides, 
jurisprudence,76 as well as the UNWGEID’s experience had also shown that the 
deprivation of liberty was essentially related to the third element of a disappearance, 
namely refusal to acknowledge the deprivation and concealment of the fate or 
whereabouts of the victim, indicating that lawful arrests or detentions could turn 
into disappearances.77 
 
The third element of the term78 depicts the denial of the proper national authorities 
to cooperate with the relatives or the counsel of the victim and inform them about 
his/her fate. It is not surprising that national authorities might refuse the 
deprivation of liberty itself79 or details about it and as a result erase all traces of the 
victim. This element is not only related to factual circumstances but it is also critical 
in achieving one of the two aims of the Convention, that of prevention and it should 
be read together with Articles 18 to 20. Article 18 refers to the right to information 
of the people with a legitimate interest and lists the accessible information, whereas 
Article 20 frames the exception, spelling out when the state can refuse the provision 
of information about the detained person. This article caused disagreement until the 
end of negotiations of the ISWG, as it was thought to distort the instrument and 
render it ineffective. The drafters of the Convention were aware of the fact that this 
provision could serve as a ‘Trojan Horse’, capable of bringing the Convention’s 
implementation to a standstill; thus they explicitly restricted its scope of application 
through the establishment of both affirmative and negative requirements. In any 
event, though, Article 2 enjoys normative supremacy over Article 20 and in case of 
conflict it prevails (Article 20(1)).  
 
However, ambiguity does not arise from the priority to be accorded the two 
provisions, but rather from which ‘conduct’ is deemed permissible. During the 
negotiations, some delegations opted for exceptions to the right to information on 
the grounds of witness protection, threats to national security, and the protection of 
the detainee’s integrity, whereas others proposed for the postponement of the 
information provision instead of refusal.80 Overall, it seems that articles 2, 18 and 20, 
on their proper interpretation protect the right to information. As a result, a 
                                                 
75 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances’ (2004) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2004/59, para. 21. 
76 Cantoral-Benavides v Peru, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 69 (18 August 
2000) paras 90-91; Neira-Alegría et al v Peru, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 20 
(19 January 1995). 
77 UNWGEID, ‘General Comment on the Definition of Enforced Disappearance’ para 7 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disappear/links.htm> accessed 3 June 2012.  
78 For the sake of coherent argumentation it is discussed before the second one. 
79 Castillo-Páez v Peru, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 34 (3 November 1997) 
para 58. 
80 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Intersessional Open-Ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally 
Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances’ 
(2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57, paras 16-29. 
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systemic interpretation would ensure maximum protection for the victim and 
his/her relatives as well.  
 
The last part to examine is the one related to the status of the perpetrators (the 
second element of the definition). According to Article 2, the perpetrators should be 
‘agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of the State’. Thus enforced disappearances are committed 
only by state actors, either direct or indirect. Non-state actors are excluded from the 
definition and Article 2 cannot be applied to them, not even by analogy, since there 
is special provision for them (Article 3). This approach caused dissatisfaction during 
the negotiations and proved to be a hard case, as members of the ISWG agreed only 
in the last section. It has been argued that the UNWGEID and the ISWG have 
adopted a ‘traditional notion’ on this topic, since they left out non-state actors.81  
 
However, a careful reading of ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) reveals what non-state actors stand for in 
the law of state responsibility and which entities are finally excluded from the 
Convention’s definition. As Special Rapporteur James Crawford points out, human 
rights supporters have long demanded the abandonment of a ‘firm distinction 
between the State and the private sector’ when the international law of state 
responsibility is applied to human rights instruments.82 The request, though, for 
‘extension of state responsibility in the private sector’ is considered to be ‘undue’.83 
According to the ARSIWA in a number of cases, non-state actors’ acts are attributed 
to the state, namely when they serve as agents of the state, when they function under 
the direction or the control of a state and lastly when armed opposition groups are 
guided by the state.84 Even if the ARSIWA guarantee in this manner that there shall 
be no impunity for non-state actors by equating them to indirect state actors, there 
are still arguments to explain why this does not correspond specifically to the 
practice of disappearances. The most convincing amongst them, is that in 
disappearances it is almost impossible to prove who committed the crime and further 
on, whether there was state involvement or not.85 The issue of non-state actors 
provoked serious discord during the sessions. The Chairperson managed to reach a 
compromise with the inclusion of Article 3. This article was cautiously phrased, as it 
refers to ‘acts defined in article 2’ and not to enforced disappearances, implying that 
the acts are characterized as such only when there is state involvement. The 
provision acknowledges states’ discretion in this field.86 In the meantime it lowers 
the victim’s protection as these acts fall outside the ratione materiae.87 The most 
                                                 
81 Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Disappearances and Summary Executions (n 1) 
para 73. 
82 James Crawford, ‘Human Rights and State Responsibility’ (12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler 
Distinguished Lecture Series, Thomas J. Dodd Research Centre, University of Connecticut, 25 
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83 Ibid para 5.  
84 Ibid para 2.  
85 The case is more complicated in countries where both state actors and non-state actors (usually 
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86 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Intersessional Open-Ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally 
Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances’ 
(2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/71, para 35. 
87 Susan McCrory, ‘The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
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serious concerns were expressed by the associations of the families of disappeared 
persons and by NGOs who argued that the provision’s scope may be distorted by 
governments in an attempt to justify their policies.  
 
Overall, the above debate can be condensed into two conflicting propositions. First, 
state involvement is a sine qua non condition of enforced disappearance. Secondly, it 
is very difficult to prove state involvement in disappearances, especially when 
indirect. Thus, what seems appropriate (so as to avoid doctrinal aberrations and 
meet the phenomenon’s particularity) is to adopt a wide interpretation of the 
ARSIWA and lower the applicable evidential threshold in cases where there are 
allegations of indirect state involvement. This view has already been introduced by 
the IACHR in the case Masacre de Pueblo Bello v. Colombia, where the Court held 
Colombia responsible for disappearances carried out by paramilitary groups.88 
 
Still, the treatment of non-state actors committing enforced disappearances is not 
the most complex part of the definition. The last phrase of Article 2 ‘which place 
such a person outside the protection of the law’ constitutes one of the major 
weaknesses of the whole text. More specifically, states disagreed on whether the 
placement of the victim outside the protection of the law was a fourth element of the 
definition (the subjective part of the crime, meaning that the intention of the 
perpetrators should be accordingly evidenced), or a mere consequence of any act of 
enforced disappearance. States having experienced enforced disappearances held that 
the placing of the victim outside the protection of the law was an ‘inherent 
consequence’ of an enforced disappearance.89 On the other side, a number of states 
urged for an additional forth constitutive element to the definition. They explained 
that it would be incompatible with their domestic penal systems to introduce a crime 
which would not ask for the establishment of the perpetrator’s intention. Apart from 
that, they also referred to the definition provided by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) where intent is a critical element.90 The 
debates left the issue unresolved and thus the Chairperson of the ISWG stated that 
states-parties ‘were fully entitled to make an interpretive declaration on the matter 
at the time of ratification.’91  
 
However, the interpretation of this phrase is found in documents prior to the 
Convention, and it leaves no doubt about the meaning of the text. According to 
UNWGEID the placement of a person outside the protection of the law is an 
aftermath of a disappearance.92 Nowak and the ISWG during its early sessions also 
side with this view, as they identify only three constitutive elements in a 
disappearance and they expressly avoid reference to it as the fourth one. Nowak also 
underlies that it would be almost impossible to identify intent in the perpetrators’ 
acts, as in most cases, they are trained to carry out specific tasks, for which they 
                                                 
88 Masacre de Pueblo Bello v Colombia, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 140 (31 
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could only be held responsible.93 Yet, the most explicit and clear statement which 
matches this view, is the one made in a UN experts’ Joint Report on secret detention: 
 
[T]he definition does not require intent to put the person concerned outside the 
protection of the law as a defining element, but rather refers to it as an objective 
consequence of the denial, refusal or concealment of the whereabouts and fate of 
the person.94   
 
The fact that states did not embrace the approach set up by the UNWGEID during 
the last decades indicates that this issue touched upon the important matter of 
reserved jurisdiction and domestic policy. The issue gains even more importance 
when it comes to the evidentiary standard set for disappearances. If ‘putting the 
victim outside the protection of law’ is to be considered an element of the definition, 
then the alleged victims should prove that the perpetrators had dolus in doing so, 
which undoubtedly makes the evidentiary threshold higher.95    
 
However, this debate was totally misleading. The purport of this phrase is properly 
revealed when examined in combination with the provisions of the OAS Convention. 
The relevant phrase in the OAS Convention is: ‘thereby impeding his or her recourse 
to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees’.96 Under the Inter-
American system, ‘outside the protection of the law’ means that the victim is denied 
recourse to legal remedies. This is a material element which concerns the victim’s 
case and not the perpetrator’s defence, an aspect which was overlooked during the 
negotiations. 
 
The fact that the ISWG Chairperson referred to it as the ‘third and half element’ of 
the definition, trying to reconcile all different views, did not remove ambiguity over 
this point. This is regrettable because it assigns priority to the crime of enforced 
disappearance passing over the right not to be subjected to it. In other words it sets 
guarantees for the protection of the potential perpetrator, minimizing the protection 
of the victim.  
  
Notwithstanding the above controversies, the Convention’s definition enjoys wide 
acceptance both by states and by human rights’ NGOs. It is also a positive 
development regarding the identity of perpetrators, even if non-state actors are 
excluded from the definition. Overall, the definition is deemed a success, not only 
because it is comprehensive but also because it offers quite a broad definition which 
in turn may well correspond to a wide variety of methods that governments apply. 
The fact that it recognizes that any kind of deprivation of liberty may result in a 
disappearance is very important especially with regards to new methods to which 
governments resort to.  
  
In this respect, contemporary practices of the ‘War on Terror’ have unfolded new 
aspects of the issue. In the name of national security many states launched anti-
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terrorist campaigns and moved towards strict legislation, thus increasing the risk 
enforced disappearances to occur. 
5. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES THROUGH THE ANTI-TERRORIST 
SPECTRUM 
  
The ‘War on Terror’ raised new issues for the law of enforced disappearances, 
regarding mainly the application of two key practices: incommunicado detentions 
and extraordinary renditions. 
  
The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks reinforced the public interest concerning 
disappearances. On the grounds of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ against the so 
called ‘Axis of Evil’, some states took austere legislative measures authorizing 
human rights’ restrictions as a safeguard to national security, whereas other states 
went further and promulgated a state of emergency.  
 
It is not the first time that such a policy has been implemented by states; since 1960s 
the language used by the Latin American authoritarian regimes identified military or 
paramilitary groups as subversives or terrorists.97 Yet now, the situation is different 
due to the fact that this policy is adopted by democratically elected governments and 
generally by countries which are often referred to as liberal democracies. In addition, 
the operations carried out after 9/11 against terrorism are unprecedented in terms of 
their intensity and state cooperation in intelligence sharing.   
 
One of the effects of these draconian laws was the substantial increase in suspects’ 
detentions which were mainly secret or incommunicado. States embarked on new 
techniques as well, which resulted in the lowering of the applicable human rights 
standards. Thus, enforced disappearances came to the fore once more, as a result of 
these circumstances. 
5.1 Incommunicado Detentions 
  
It has been already mentioned that a deprivation of liberty is just one of the three 
constitutive elements of an enforced disappearance. Also, according to the definition 
in the 2007 Convention every kind of deprivation of liberty might turn into a 
disappearance. Indeed, some methods place the detainee under an incredibly high 
risk and result almost always in a disappearance. ‘Incommunicado detention’ is, in 
these terms, a means of erasing all traces of the victim. The term describes the 
detainee’s absolute confinement from the outside world. The victim is not allowed to 
communicate with people other than his/her captors. 
 
The implications of incommunicado detention are several and relate mostly to the 
victim’s protection. The victim is unable to notify his family of this new situation 
and the reasons for his custody and also cannot consult a lawyer. His confinement 
indicates a further denial by the victim’s captors to bring him/her before the 
                                                 
97 Bámaca-Velásquez v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 70 (25 
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judiciary.98 Because of these restrictions, the detainee’s treatment is in the captors’ 
absolute discretion and may ‘invite other forms of coercion’.99  
 
Incommunicado detention is not a novel practice and has already been addressed by 
the international community.100 The question though, is whether an incommunicado 
detention may amount to, or result in an enforced disappearance, given the human 
rights’ curtailments that states have already introduced and are willing to undertake 
under their anti-terrorist campaigns. The UNWGEID has stressed the potential 
relationship between the two since 2003.101 According to UNWGEID’s Reports and 
the Convention, incommunicado detention falls under the states’ obligation to take 
preventive measures against disappearances and to refrain from using any methods 
that endanger a detainee’s security. The Convention does not mention 
incommunicado detention expressis verbis, but it can be argued that it implies it in 
article 17(2)(d) (read in conjunction with article 17(1) which refers to secret 
detention): 
 
[…][e]ach State Party shall, in its legislation: Guarantee that any person 
deprived of liberty shall be authorized to communicate with and be visited by his 
or her family, counsel or any other person of his or her choice, subject only to 
the conditions established by law, or, if he or she is a foreigner, to communicate 
with his or her consular authorities, in accordance with applicable international 
law. 
          
The Convention’s rationale denotes that the drafters understood incommunicado 
detention as a particular form that secret detention may attain (incommunicado 
detention is an aspect of secret detention: article 17(2) seeks to address the violations 
a person suffers when secretly detained). Contrary to this view, some commentators 
place incommunicado just before disappearances in the scale of severity. In other 
words, an enforced disappearance is considered ‘a heinous form of incommunicado 
detention’.102 Apparently this view misconceives the complexity of an enforced 
disappearance; however, the value of equating these two practices is obvious only 
exceptionally when it comes to the newly developed anti-terrorist policies.  
 
In the post 9/11 era, incommunicado detentions are standard tools to confront 
terrorism and to avert future attacks. The scope of the undertaken measures is not 
the individual’s extermination (as it was in the 1960s), but the weakening of the 
terrorist organization’s structures. Thus, the captors aim at the extraction of the 
best available information. To that end, a detainee’s confinement enables the 
authorities to apply severe interrogation techniques affecting his/her treatment,103 
but not concluding in torture that will cause irreparable damage or in extrajudicial 
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executions. This, of course, does not guarantee humane treatment for detainees. 
Recent statistics prove that ill-treatment is almost inevitable during incommunicado 
detention104 and detainees are exposed both to physical and mental suffering. 
 
Furthermore, confinement enables the authorities to leave the suspects 
incommunicado for a prolonged period (this tactic apart from the detainees’ 
debilitation also ensures that there is no communication with other suspected 
terrorists), which constitutes per se cruel inhuman and degrading treatment105 and is 
a prima facie violation of the ICCPR106 and of the IACHR.107 The data available 
shows that terrorist suspects are usually held incommunicado for months or even 
years,108 while the HRC held as early as in 1979 that even 6 weeks of 
incommunicado detention is a breach of the Covenant.109 In addition, the ECHR 
found a fourteen days incommunicado detention to be exceptionally long, even when 
there is a state of public emergency because of a terrorist threat.110 Prisoners that 
are under prolonged incommunicado detention are usually referred to as ‘Ghost 
Detainees’. This term describes eloquently the detainees’ absolute alienation from 
the society and that their very existence depends solely on the information they 
possess.  
 
It seems that prolonged confinement and severe interrogation methods applied to 
alleged terrorists fulfill all the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention and set 
up the causal link between incommunicado detentions and enforced disappearances. 
Obviously, the current conditions of terrorism suspects’ detentions leave no doubt 
that these individuals are eventually disappeared under human rights standards for 
so long as they are in confinement. The key element is that the state also refuses to 
acknowledge their detention and whereabouts. The fact that at some point they may 
be put on trial or get released does not affect their characterization as disappeared, 
since neither the 2007 Convention nor international jurisprudence ask for the 
victim’s death or interminable capture.111 This, also, does not reduce their next of 
kin’s anguish over their fate. Their relatives cannot be aware of the patterns that 
intelligence services follow and therefore they fear for the detainees’ life.   
  
The extensive application of incommunicado detentions in the ‘War on Terror’ 
might also mark a turn in enforced disappearances’ jurisprudence. So far, the 
international human rights courts have in the majority of cases presumed the 
victim’s death because there were allegations of ill-treatment. However, 
contemporary enforced disappearances occur under different conditions. As victims 
are likely to reappear, courts should be more cautious in presuming their death; this 
clearly indicates that disappearances could be dissociated from the right to life. 
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Although, it could be argued that a shift in international jurisprudence comes dimly 
into sight,112 it is rather premature to deem a general change since jurisprudence is 
only now evolving on the issue. 
5.2 Extraordinary Renditions 
 
The anti-terrorism measures have reasonably incited domestic criticism in the states 
that adopted them. Human rights NGOs and the mass media stressed the legal 
contraventions they entailed and further enumerated their inconsistencies both with 
domestic laws and international obligations. As a result, public opinion started 
opposing some of the adopted rules, despite the fact that terrorism remains on top of 
the agenda regarding national security and is still considered as a potential danger. 
Therefore, governments faced constant pressure to disclose information about the 
detention conditions of terrorist suspects while their refusal to do so exacerbated 
domestic reactions. Some states in an attempt to evade accusations for human rights 
violations (at least regarding domestic legal standards) turned to other methods. 
That was the critical point when extraordinary renditions became a commonly 
applied tool in the War on Terror, also affecting enforced disappearances. 
 
‘Extraordinary rendition’ is neither a legal term nor an entirely new one.113 In 
regard to enforced disappearances, it is well suggested that extraordinary renditions 
have been used by governments since the 1970s. At that time, intelligence services of 
several Latin American countries had created a network of information-sharing for 
alleged ‘subversives/terrorists’. This networking is also known as Operation Condor 
(Operación Condor).114 However, this is a rather primitive form of the methods that 
states have developed after 9/11. 
 
Indeed, extraordinary rendition is now used to describe the transfer of alleged 
terrorists from the country where they are apprehended to states with 
underdeveloped and poor human rights protection. In other words, it is a forcible 
transboundary movement,115 a complex method which requires the cooperation of at 
least three countries: the captor, the accomplice and the extractor state. The suspect 
is usually caught in the borders or in airports of a country (the accomplice state) by 
secret agents of another country (the captor state). The victim is then taken to a 
third country, where he is held in custody and interrogated (the extractor state). In 
most cases, the interrogation takes place in secret detention centers, over which the 
captor state’s secret services exercise a significant degree of control. Extraordinary 
renditions have not been standardized up till now as there is not any standard 
pattern followed.116 Despite several variations that have been recorded so far, there 
is a common feature in all such incidents: the element of extraterritoriality vis-à-vis 
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the captor state. The suspects are apprehended, detained and interrogated abroad, 
yet on behalf of the captor state; moreover, the victims are foreign nationals.117   
 
Captor states try to accomplish two goals through extraordinary renditions. First 
and above all, they prefer increased harshness during interrogations to yield the 
maximum benefit on intelligence gathering grounds. However, constitutional and 
legal guarantees in combination with effective enforcement mechanisms almost 
prohibit the use of severe techniques in their territory, as victims may ask for judicial 
protection. This explains the second goal, which is to fully deprive the transferred 
from access to their judicial system where they can challenge their treatment during 
detention.118 In other words, the captor state tries by all means to avoid its domestic 
legislation and to create a ‘legal lacuna’.   
  
The detainees’ lives are in jeopardy since extraordinary rendition reduces their legal 
protection to the bare-minimum, permitting grave human rights violations.  
Extraordinary renditions should be undoubtedly placed among practices to 
disappear individuals, as they are ‘designed to evade public and judicial scrutiny, to 
hide the identity of the perpetrators and the fate of the victims’.119 They also 
constitute ‘a degrading and dehumanizing practice for the victims’,120 because they 
are aware of their inability to reach both the outside world and also the judiciary. It 
is this inability that equates extraordinary renditions to enforced disappearances and 
differentiates them from mere international abductions.121 
  
The UNWGEID came round to this view in 2004 and further mentioned that the 
practice constitutes a breach to the 1992 Declaration.122 It also came across 
extraordinary renditions when examining the complaint of Maher Arar. This is one 
of the very few complaints that have gained publicity until now, mainly due to 
efforts made by Canadian human rights NGOs and by the victim’s wife. The victim, 
a national of Canada, was detained in an American airport while returning from 
Tunisia.123 He was then transferred to Syria to be interrogated on his alleged links 
with Al-Qaeda, where he was kept nearly for a year. After his release Arar brought 
his claims before American Courts, only to be rejected on jurisdictional grounds.124 
This is indicative of the juridical difficulties the practice entails. So far, national 
courts have rejected similar claims based either on lack of jurisdiction or on aspects 
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of national security.125 Apart from some exceptions,126 domestic jurisprudence has 
generally arrived at unsatisfactory judgments for the victims.     
 
The Convention’s application in the case of incommunicado detentions and 
extraordinary renditions is beneficial for the protection of detainees. It has already 
been alluded, that states tried to limit their human rights obligations by derogating 
from major international instruments on grounds of public emergency. Such 
derogations affected mostly the right to liberty and the due process guarantees 
attached to it. As noted above, they were enforced with laws which permitted 
prolonged incommunicado detentions and unlawful renditions.127 At this point, the 
2007 Convention may prove to be a useful tool, enhancing the victims’ protection. 
The characterization of the discussed methods as enforced disappearances has at 
least two obvious advantages. First of all, their complex nature will be 
acknowledged. It is a more realistic and systematic approach which affirms the 
danger for the victims since they cannot inform anyone of their current status and 
seek help. Secondly, under the 2007 Convention the right not to be subjected to 
enforced disappearance is non-derogable. Article 1(2) of the Convention contains an 
absolute prohibition on enforced disappearances precluding derogations under any 
possible justification. Prolonged incommunicado detentions and extraordinary 
renditions will therefore be utterly outlawed since the Convention leaves no space 
for a gray area in this field. Although human rights commentators link these two 
practices to enforced disappearances in general, they haven’t examined them under 
the Convention’s framework, although the latter provides a straightforward and 
sound response to the current international concerns. Hence, it constitutes a 
valuable underpinning for the individuals’ protection. 
5. CONCLUSION 
  
Enforced disappearances are a widespread phenomenon that involves extreme 
suffering for the victims, and consequently it has attracted much international 
attention. Public ignorance alongside conceptual difficulties are just a few of the 
reasons which delayed the adoption of a legally binding instrument to regulate 
enforced disappearances. However, the international UN human rights regime 
reserved a unique approach to enforced disappearances. Indeed, the preference 
towards creating the UNWGEID over drafting a Convention seemed more 
reasonable in the 1980s; almost 30 years later, enforced disappearances have 
generated considerable concern on a global scale, and the international community is 
finally ready enforce a legally binding instrument.     
 
The adoption of the 2007 Convention is by far the most prominent response to 
enforced disappearances. The effectiveness and success of the instrument cannot be 
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measured, since it has entered into force only a few months ago. Nevertheless, it is 
fair to say that the Convention is a rather powerful instrument as it provides a 
comprehensive definition for enforced disappearances and pronounces a right of all 
peoples not to be subjected to enforced disappearances.  
 
The phenomenon’s particularity lies in the authorities’ refusal to disclose 
information on the victims’ fate or whereabouts; this refusal renders them essentially 
helpless. This aspect is well treated by the definition and the Convention as a whole; 
more specifically, any practice that is mainly characterized by an attempt to efface 
traces of the victim can be classified as an act of enforced disappearance. This 
approach signals that methods such as extraordinary renditions and incommunicado 
detentions can be characterized as enforced disappearances. Therefore, the 
Convention’s scope of application is not confined within the limits of methods that 
have already emerged. It may also cover new practices that are not yet standardized. 
Overall, the 2007 Convention signifies considerable progress in the field of 
international human rights law. This is affirmed through the provided definition, 
which is flexible enough to respond to present demands and also to adapt to future 
legal challenges. 
 
